Abstract-We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem for a population of agents playing aggregative games with affine coupling constraints. We focus on semi-decentralized communication architectures, where there is a central coordinator able to gather and broadcast signals of aggregative nature to the agents. By exploiting the framework of monotone operator theory and operator splitting, we first critically review the most relevant available algorithms and then design two novel schemes: (i) a single-layer, fixed-step algorithm with convergence guarantee for general (non-cocoercive, non-strictly) monotone aggregative games and (ii) a single-layer proximal-type algorithm for a class of monotone aggregative games with linearly coupled cost functions. We also design novel accelerated variants of two algorithms via (alternating) inertial steps. Finally, we show via numerical simulations that the proposed algorithms outperform those in the literature in terms of convergence speed.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Aggregative games
A N aggregative game is a set of coupled optimization problems, each associated with an autonomous agent, i.e., an independent decision maker, where the cost function of each agent depends on some aggregate effect of all the agents in the population [1] , [2] , [3] . Namely, the aggregative feature arises whenever each agent is affected by the overall population behavior, hence not by some specific agents. In general, such a special feature is typical of incentive-based control in competitive markets [4] and in fact engineering applications of aggregative games span from demand side management in the smart grid [5] [6] and charging control for plug-in electric vehicles [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , to spectrum sharing in wireless networks [11] and network congestion control [12] . With these motivating applications in mind, aggregative games have been receiving high research interest, within the operations research [13] and especially the automatic control [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] communities. Researchers have in fact studied and proposed solutions to the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) in aggregative games, which is the problem to compute a set of decisions such that each is individually optimal given the others. Remarkably, the aggregative structure has been exploited to mitigate the computational complexity for large population size, and in fact the proposed solution G. Belgioioso is with the Control Systems group, TU Eindhoven, The Netherlands. S. Grammatico is with the Delft Center for Systems and Control (DCSC), TU Delft, The Netherlands. E-mail addresses: g.belgioioso@tue.nl, s.grammatico@tudelft.nl. This work was partially supported by NWO under research projects OMEGA (613.001.702) and P2P-TALES (647.003.003), and by the ERC under research project COSMOS (802348).
algorithms are primarily non-centralized, i.e., almost (semi-) decentralized and distributed, where the computations by the agents are fully decoupled. Essentially, in semi-decentralized algorithms, the agents do not communicate with each other, but rely on a reliable central coordinator (e.g. an aggregator) that gathers the local decisions in aggregative form and then broadcasts (incentive) signals, e.g. dual variables, to all the agents [15] . On the other hand, in distributed algorithms, there is no central coordinator, so the agents communicate with each other to cooperatively estimate or reach consensus on the signals of common interest, e.g. dual and auxiliary variables. The latter algorithmic setup is also called partialdecision information [20] , [21] , because the agents do not have direct access to the aggregative effect on their cost functions, thus they should estimate it via reliable, truthful peer-to-peer communications, e.g. via cooperative consensus protocols. These features motivate us to focus on the semidecentralized algorithmic structure in this paper.
B. Literature review
The literature on semi-decentralized GNE seeking in aggregative games is quite recent. In [15] Belgioioso and Grammatico designed the first semi-decentralized GNE seeking algorithm for (non-strictly/strongly, non-cocoercive) monotone aggregative games 1 , where the algorithm derivation relies on the so-called forward-backward-forward (FBF) operator splitting. In parallel, for the class of strongly monotone games, Yi and Pavel proposed the first preconditioned forwardbackward (pFB) operator splitting method [22] , [23] , which is applicable to aggregative games with semi-decentralized algorithmic structure -as shown in [24] , the outcome of the pFB method for aggregative games is in fact the so-called asymmetric project algorithm (APA) [25, §12.5 .1], proposed for aggregative games in [17] . Effectively, [15] and [22] are the first works to adopt an elegant and general mathematical approach based on monotone operator theory [26] to explicitly model GNEPs, to decouple the coupling constraints via Lagrangian duality, and in turn to exploit operator splitting methods for systematically designing (non-centralized) GNE seeking algorithms. Next, we refer to some other relevant GNE seeking algorithms for or applicable to aggregative games. For a class of unconstrained strictly monotone games, in [6] , Ye and Hu proposed continuous-time saddle-point dynamics. For strictly monotone games with equality coupling constraints, in [16] , Liang, Yi and Hong proposed continuous-time projected pseudo-gradient dynamics paired with discontinuous dynamics for dual and auxiliary variables. For unconstrained, strongly monotone aggregative games, in [18] , Deng and Liang proposed continuous-time, integral consensus-based dynamics. Recently, in [19] , De Persis and Grammatico proposed continuous-time, integral dynamics for a class of strongly monotone aggregative games.
From the literature on (semi-decentralized) GNE seeking in aggregative games, several critical issues emerge. First, the solution methods available for general (non-strictly, noncocoercive) monotone aggregative games are limited to algorithms that require at least two demanding computations (projections) and two communications (between the agents and the coordinator) at each iteration, see e.g. the FBF [15] and extra-gradient (EG) based methods [25, §12.6 .1]; instead, computationally convenient algorithms, e.g. the pFB [23] , require strong monotonicity of the game. Surprizingly, there is currently no single-communication-per-iteration, fixedstep algorithm for merely monotone aggregative games. For instance, the pFB method does not always converge in merely monotone games, not even under vanishing step sizes [27] . From a practical perspective, the available algorithms may require a large number of iterations, and in particular of communications between the agents and the central coordinator, to converge. For example, algorithms based on the iterative Tikhonov regularization (ITR) [28] require doublelayer vanishing step sizes, which considerably slows down convergence. In fact, some researchers are currently working on accelerated algorithms for certain classes of (so far nongeneralized) NEPs [29] . Finally, often, the local step sizes of the algorithms are based on global properties of the game data, that however should be unknown to the local agents in practice -on the contrary, little or no coordination among agents should be necessary to set the step sizes with guaranteed convergence.
C. Contribution
In this paper, we fully exploit monotone operator theory and operator splitting methodologies to study and address the main technical and computational issues that currently afflict (semi-decentralized) GNE seeking in aggregative games. Specifically, our main contributions are summarized next: 1. We review the available (semi-decentralized) algorithms from a general operator-theoretic perspective, which allows us to establish basically the most general convergence results and draw a fair technical comparison among these algorithms ( §III), as well as to possibly improve convergence speed, e.g. via inertial accelerations; 2. We present the first single-layer, single-communicationper-iteration, fixed-step algorithm for (non-strictly, noncocoercive) monotone aggregative games ( §IV-A) -essentially, the most desirable algorithmic features for the most general class of monotone aggregative games one could hope for; 3. We present a very fast, single-layer, single-communication-
per-iteration, fixed-step, proximal algorithm for a class of (non-strictly) monotone aggregative games with linearly coupled cost functions ( §IV-B) -essentially, the most desirable algorithmic features with the fastest convergence ever experienced for a special, recurrent, class of monotone aggregative games; 4. We design an alternating inertial acceleration scheme which is applicable to some algorithms ( §IV-C) and that, remarkably, outperforms the classic inertial acceleration in terms of numerical convergence -mathematically, we prove that our alternating inertia preserves averageness of operators, thus the convergence is desirably Fejér monotone.
D. Notation and definitions
Basic notation: R denotes the set of real numbers, and R := R ∪ {∞} the set of extended real numbers. 0 (1) denotes a matrix/vector with all elements equal to 0 (1); to improve clarity, we may add the dimension of these matrices/vectors as subscript. A ⊗ B denotes the Kronecker product between the matrices A and B. For a square matrix A ∈ R n×n , it transpose is A ⊤ , [A] i,j represents the element on the row i and column j. A ≻ 0 ( 0) stands for positive definite (semidefinite) matrix. Given A ≻ 0, · A denotes the A-induced norm, such that x A = x ⊤ Ax. A denotes the largest singular value of A. Given N scalars, a 1 , . . . , a N , diag(a 1 , . . . , a N ) denotes the diagonal matrix with a 1 , . . . , a N on the main diagonal.
Operator-theoretic definitions: Id(·) denotes the identity operator. The mapping ι S : R n → {0, ∞} denotes the indicator function for the set S ⊆ R n , i.e., ι S (x) = 0 if x ∈ S, ∞ otherwise. For a closed set S ⊆ R n , the mapping proj S : R n → S denotes the projection onto S, i.e., proj S (x) = argmin y∈S y − x . The set-valued mapping N S : R n ⇒ R n denotes the normal cone operator for the set S ⊆ R n , i.e.,
−1 denotes the resolvent operator of F ; fix (F ) := {x ∈ R n | x ∈ F (x)} and zer (F ) := {x ∈ R n | 0 ∈ A(x)} denote the set of fixed points and of zeros, respectively.
II. THE GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM IN AGGREGATIVE GAMES
A. Problem statement
We consider a set of N agents, where each agent i ∈ I := {1, . . . , N } shall choose its decision variable (i.e., strategy) x i from the local decision set Ω i ⊂ R n with the aim of minimizing its local cost function J i (x i , x −i ), which depends on the local variable x i (first argument) and on the decision variables of the other agents,
(second argument).
In this paper, we focus on the class of aggregative games, where the cost function of each agent depends on the local decision variable and on the value of the aggregation, i.e.,
Specifically, we consider local cost functions of the form
where g i : R n → R is a convex, possibly non-smooth local term and f i : R n × R n → R is continuously differentiable and convex with respect to the local decision variable x i . The cost functions as in (2) are the most general considered in the literature of monotone games, see [30, Remark 1] , [31] .
Furthermore, we consider generalized games, where the coupling among the agents arises not only via the cost functions, but also via their feasible decision sets. In our setup, the coupling constraints are described by an affine function,
Thus, the collective global feasible set, X ⊂ R nN , reads as
while the feasible decision set of each agent i ∈ I is characterized by the set-valued mapping X i , defined as
, where A i ∈ R m×n and b i are local parameters that define how agent i is involved in the coupling constraints.
Remark 1: Affine coupling constraints, as considered in (3), are very common in the literature of monotone games, see for example [14] , [16] , [17] , [23] .
Next, let us formalize standard convexity and compactness assumptions for the constraint sets and convexity for the local cost functions. Assumption 1: For each i ∈ I, the function g i is convex and the function f i is continuously differentiable and convex in x i . For each i ∈ I, the set Ω i is nonempty, compact and convex. The set X satisfies Slater's constraint qualification.
In summary, the aim of each agent i, given the aggregate decision avg(x), is to choose a strategy, x * i , that solves its local convex optimization problem according to the game setup previously described, i.e., for all i ∈ I
where the last constraint is equivalent to Ax − b ≤ 0. From a game-theoretic perspective, we consider the problem to compute a Nash equilibrium [32] , as formalized next. Definition 1 (Generalized ε−Nash equilibrium): A collective strategy x * ∈ X is a generalized ε−Nash equilibrium (ε−GNE) of the game in (4) if, for all i ∈ I:
If (5) holds with ε = 0, then x * is a GNE.
In other words, a set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if no agent can improve its objective function by unilaterally changing its strategy to another feasible one.
Remark 2 (Existence of a GNE):
Under Assumption 1, the existence of a GNE of the game in (4) follows from Brouwer's fixed-point theorem [33, Proposition 12.7] , while uniqueness does not hold in general.
B. Nash vs Aggregative (or Wardrop) Equilibria
In aggregative games with cost functions as in (2) , the condition in (5) specializes as: for all i ∈ I and y ∈ X i (x * −i )
where the decision variable of agent i, x * i , appears also in the second argument of f i , since x * i contributes to form the average strategy, i.e., avg(x
The concept of aggregative (or Wardrop) equilibrium (formalized in Definition 2) springs from the intuition that theWe note that Nash and aggregative equilibria are strictly connected. In fact, under some mild assumptions, it can be proven that every GAE equilibrium is an ε-GNE equilibrium, with ε vanishing as N diverges [17, §4] . Thus, in large scale games where the agents are unaware of the population size, a GAE represents a good approximation of a GNE.
C. Variational equilibria and pseudo-subdifferential mapping
In this paper, we focus on the subclass of variational GNE (v-GNE) that corresponds to the solution set of an appropriate generalized variational inequality, i.e., GVI(P, X ), namely, the problem of finding x * ∈ X such that
where the mapping P : R nN ⇒ R nN denotes the so-called pseudo-subdifferential (PS) of the game in (4), defined as
Namely, the mapping P is obtained by stacking together the subdifferentials of the agent cost functions with respect to their local decision variables. Given the aggregative structure of the cost functions in (2), we note that the PS can be written as the sum of a set-valued mapping and a single-valued one:
In the remainder of the paper, let us refer to F as pseudogradient mapping (with a little abuse of terminology). Note that, since the local decision variable x i of agent i enters also in the second argument of the cost function f i , we have
Under Assumptions 1, it follows by [33, Prop. 12.4 ] that any solution to GVI(P, X ) is a (variational) Nash equilibrium of the game in (4) . The inverse implication is not true in general, and actually in passing from the Nash equilibrium problem to the GVI problem most solutions are lost [33, §12.2.2]; indeed, a game may have a Nash equilibrium while the corresponding GVI has no solution. Note that, when the cost functions J i 's in (2) are differentiable, i.e., g i = 0 for all i ∈ I, then P is a single-valued mapping and GVI(P, X ) reduces to VI(F, X ), which is commonly addressed in the context of game theory via projected-psuedogradient algorithms, e.g. [13] , [17] , [24] , [25, §12] .
A sufficient condition for the existence (and uniqueness) of a variational GNE (v-GNE) is that P is (strictly) monotone [33, Prop. 12.11] , as postulated next.
Assumption 2 (Monotone and Lipschitz pseudo-gradient):
The mapping F in (8) is maximally monotone and ℓ−Lipschitz continuous over Ω, for some ℓ > 0.
It directly follows that also the pseudo-subdifferential P is maximally monotone since it is the sum of two maximally monotone operators [26, Cor. 24.4] , i.e., P = G+ F , where G is maximally monotone as concatenation of maximally monotone operators (i.e., the subdifferentials of the convex functions g i 's) [26, Prop. 20.23] , and F is maximally monotone by Assumption 2.
Remark 3 (Approximate pseudo-gradient):
As the population size grows, the second term in the right hand side of (9) vanishes. In fact, we have that
Thus, let us define an approximate version of the PG in (8) for large-scale games, i.e.,
and the correspondent approximate PS, i.e.,
As for v-GNE, one can show that any solution to GVI(P , X ) is a (variational) aggregative equilibrium (v-GAE) of the game in (4) [19] .
D. Nash equilibria as zeros of a monotone operator
In this section, we exploit operator theory to recast the Nash equilibrium problem into a monotone inclusion, namely, the problem of finding a zero of a set-valued monotone operator. As first step, we characterize a GNE of the game in terms of KKT conditions of the inter-dependent optimization problems in (4). For each agent i ∈ N , let us introduce the Lagrangian function L i , defined as 
The Slater's condition in Assumption 1 is needed at this stage to ensures boundedness of the dual variables λ i 's. Similarly, we characterize a v-GNE in term of KKT conditions by exploiting the Lagrangian duality scheme for the corresponding GVI problem, see [34, §3.2] . Specifically, by [34, Th. 3 
.1], x
* is a solution of GVI(X , P ) if and only if there exists a dual variable λ
To cast (14) in compact form, we introduce the set-valued
Essentially, the role of the mapping T is that its zeros correspond to the v-GNE of the game in (4), as formalized in the next statement.
Proposition 1: Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
III. GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING: OPERATOR-THEORETIC REVIEW
A. Zero finding methods for GNE seeking
In Section II-D, we show that the original GNE seeking problem corresponds to the following generalized equation:
Next, we show that the mapping T can be written as the sum of two operators, i.e., T = T 1 + T 2 , where
and S is a skew symmetric matrix, i.e., S ⊤ = −S, defined as
The formulation T = T 1 + T 2 is called splitting of T , and we exploit it in different ways later on. We show next that the mappings T 1 and T 2 are both maximally monotone, which paves the way for operator splitting algorithms [26, § 26] . (18) and T in (15) are maximally monotone.
Proof: T 1 is maximally monotone since F is such by Assumption 2, b is a constant, thus maximally monotone, and the concatenation of maximally monotone operator remains maximally monotone [26, Prop. 20.23] . The first term of
, is maximally monotone, since normal cones of closed convex sets are maximally monotone and the concatenation preserves maximality [26, Prop. 20.23] ; the second term, i.e., S, is linear and skew symmetric, i.e., S ⊤ = −S, thus maximally monotone [26, Ex. 20.30] . Then, the sum of the previous terms, namely, T 2 , is maximally monotone by [26, Cor. 24.4] , since dom S = R nN +m . Equivalently, the maximal monotonicity of
In the remainder of this section we discuss the main features and limitations of some existing semi-decentralized algorithms for aggregative games with coupling constraints from a general operator-theoretic perspective.
Remark 4 (Generalized aggregative equilibrium seeking):
In light of Proposition 2, the same operator theoretic approach can be exploited to recast the GAE seeking problem as a monotone inclusion. It follows that all the GNE seeking algorithms introduced in the remainder of this paper can be adopted to find a GAE. Specifically, for gradient-based algorithms, it is sufficient to replace ∇ xi f i (x i , avg(x)) in (9) with its approximate version i.e., ∇ xi f i (x i , z) z=avg(x) .
B. Preconditioned forward-backward algorithm
The main idea of the preconditioned forward-backward algorithm (pFB) is that the zeros of the mapping T in (15) correspond to the fixed points of a certain operator which depends on the chosen splitting (17)− (18) [26, §26.3] and on an arbitrary symmetric, positive definite matrix Φ, known as preconditioning matrix [22] . The pFB method, proposed in
Iterate until convergence: 1. Local: Strategy update, for all i ∈ I:
[22] for strongly monotone games, is applicable to aggregative games with semi-decentralized algorithmic structure [24] , in which case it reduces to the APA [25, §12.5.1], also proposed in [17] . A critical assumption for the convergence of this method is the cocoercivity of the pseudogradient mapping F in (8), as postulated next.
Assumption 3 (Cocoercive pseudo-gradient):
The mapping F in (8) is γ−cocoercive on Ω, for some γ > 0.
Remark 5:
If F is µ−strongly monotone and ℓ−Lipschitz, µ, ℓ > 0, then F is (µ/ℓ 2 )−cocoercive. On the contrary, cocoercive mappings are not necessarily strongly monotone, e.g. the gradient of a non-strictly convex, smooth function.
Remark 6: a) The local auxiliary variables y i 's and d i 's are introduced to cast Algorithm 1 in a more compact form. The quantity avg(d
) measures the violation of the coupling constraints, technically, is the "reflected violation" of the constraints at iteration k. b) The proximal operator in Algorithm 1 reads as
If the cost function of agent i is continuously differentiable, i.e., g i = 0, then its primal update in Algorithm 1 becomes a projection, i.e., prox gi+ιΩ i = proj Ωi .
If Assumption 3 holds true and the step sizes {α i } i∈I and β are chosen small enough, then the sequence (col(x k , λ k )) k∈N generated by Algorithm 1 converges to some col(x * , λ * ) ∈ zer(T ), where x * is a v-GNE, see [24, Th. 1] for a formal proof of convergence.
Algorithm 1 is semi-decentralized. In fact, at each iteration k, a central coordinator is needed to:
(i) gather and broadcast the average strategy avg(x k ); (ii) gather the reflected violation of the constraints avg(d k ); (iii) update and broadcast the dual variable λ k .
Specifically, after each central and local update in Algorithm 1, a communication stage follows. The central coordinator broadcasts to all the agents the current values of the aggregate function avg(x k ) and the multiplier vector λ k . In return, each agent i ∈ I updates its own strategy x i , based on the received signals, and forwards it to the central coordinator.
Moreover, at each iteration only two vectors, in R n and R m respectively, are broadcast, independently on the population size N . Each decentralized computation consists of solving a finite dimensional convex optimization problem, for which efficient algorithms are available.
Remark 7:
The primal-dual iterations of Algorithm 1 are sequential, namely, while the local primal updates x k+1 i can be performed in parallel, the dual update, λ k+1 , exploits the most recent value of the agents' strategies, d k+1 i
. This feature is convenient since it follows the natural information flow in the considered semi-decentralized communication structure.
Algorithm 1 as a fixed-point iteration:
The dynamics generated by Algorithm 1 can be cast in a compact form as the fixed-point iteration
where 
where T 1 and T 2 as in (17)− (18) and Φ is a preconditining matrix, here defined as
. When the mapping T 1 is cocoercive (Assumption 3), T 2 is maximally monotone (Lemma 1) and the step-sizes in the main diagonal of Φ are set as in Algorithm 1, then the preconditioned mappings Φ −1 T 1 and Φ −1 T 2 satisfy the following properties with respect to the Φ−induced norm ([23, Lemma 7] ): 
, where fix(R FB ) = zer(T ) = ∅ and, therefore, x * is a v-GNE by Prop. 1. We refer to [23] , [24] for a complete convergence analysis of this algorithm.
Inertial pFB algorithm:
To conclude this section, we recall the inertial version of the pFB (Algorithm 1), originally proposed for the more general context of generalized network games in [23, Alg. 2] .
We note that the inertial extrapolation phase, at the end of the local and central updates, improves the converge properties of the pFB algorithm. The convergence of Algorithm 1B can be studied via fixed-point theory [36] , or by relying on the inertial version of the FB splitting method [37] , as discussed in the next remark. We refer to [23, Th. 2] for a complete convergence proof of this algorithm.
ALGORITHM 1B: Inertial pFB (I-pFB)
Algorithm 1B as a fixed-point iteration:
The dynamics generated by Algorithm 1B can be cast in a compact form as the following inertial fixed-point iteration:
where
are the stacked vectors of the iterates and R FB is the FB operator defined in (21) . The convergence analysis of inertial schemes as in (23) are studied in [36] ; while more precise conditions for the convergence of (23) are derived in [37, Th. 1].
C. Algorithms for (non-strictly) monotone aggregative games
When the pseudo-gradient mapping F is non-cocoercive, non-striclty monotone, then Algorithm 1 may fail to converge, see [27] for an example of non-convergence of Algorithm 1. Few algorithms are available in the literature for solving merely monotone (aggregative) games with coupling constraints, each with important technical or computational limitations.
Iterative Tikhonov regularization: To be applicable to aggregative games with (non-cocoercive, non-strictly) monotone pseudo-gradient mapping, the forward-backward algorithm should be augmented with a vanishing regularization. This approach -originally developed in the broader context of network games -is known as iterative Tikhonov regularization (ITR) and generates a forward-backward algorithm with doublelayer vanishing step sizes [28] , where the actual step size must vanish faster than the vanishing regularization term [28, (A2.2), §2.1]. The next table summarizes the ITR algorithm when applied to generalized aggregative games.
The convergence of the sequence (x k ) k∈N generated by Algorithm 2 to a v-GNE is guaranteed when the pseudogradient mapping F is monotone and Lipschitz continuous (Assumption 2) and the step-size sequences (γ k ) k∈N and ALGORITHM 2: Iterative Tikhonov regularization (ITR)
Initialization: For all i ∈ I:
−α with 1/2 < α + β ≤ 1, β > α and n j ∈ N >0 .
Central coordinator: Dual variable update
(ǫ k ) k∈N are driven to zero at appropriate rates. A formal proof of convergence can be found in [28] , where the stepsize sequences either match across users (fully coordinated) or may differ (partially coordinated).
In practice, methods based on (double-layer) vanishing step sizes have slow speed of convergence, which is computationally undesirable. Differentiability of the local cost functions, i.e., g i = 0 for all i ∈ I, is another technical limitation of ITR schemes.
Inexact preconditioned proximal-point:
Recently, the inexact preconditioned proximal-point (PPP) method [30] was proposed to solve monotone (aggregative) games, virtually with no additional technical assumption other than monotonicity of the pseudo-subdifferential mapping P . Algorithm 3 summarizes the application of the PPP algorithm to aggregative games.
At each iteration k, the inner loop (step 2) of Alg. 3 consists of solving (inexactly) an aggregative game without coupling constraints, whose PS, i.e.,F
Algorithm 3 as a fixed-point iteration:
The dynamics generated by Algorithm 3 can be cast in compact form as the fixed-point iteration:
is the vector of primal-dual iterates, J Φ −1 T is the so-called resolvent operator of the mapping Φ −1 T , defined as
and e k is an error term that accounts for the inexact computations of the resolvent J Φ −1 T (ω k ). When the mapping T is maximally monotone (Lemma 1) and the step-sizes in the main diagonal of Φ are set such that Φ ≻ 0, then the resolvent J Φ −1 T is firmly nonexpansive [26, Prop. 23.8] (1/2−averaged) w.r.t. the Φ-induced norm, i.e., · Φ . Moreover, if the error sequence (e k ) k∈N is summable (which is guaranteed by setting ∞ k=0 ε k < ∞), then the inexact fixed-point iteration (24) converges to some ω
Iterate until convergence: 1. Local: Augmented cost function update. For all i ∈ I:
Inner loop (ε−NE seeking problem): findx 1 , . . . ,x N s.t.
x * is a v-GNE. We refer to [30] for a complete convergence analysis of Algorithm 3.
Remark 8 (Double-layer):
Unfortunately, the PPP method generates a double-layer algorithm, in which each (outer) iteration involves the solution of a sub-game without coupling constraints, via nested (inner) iterations, and, therefore, requires multiple communication stages between the agents and the central coordinator. As for (doubly) vanishing step sizes, we can regard double-layer or nested iterations as an important computational limitation. 
Algorithm 4 as a fixed-point iteration:
In compact form, the dynamics generated by Algorithm 4 read as the fixed-point iteration
ALGORITHM 4: Tseng's forward-backward-forward (FBF)
3. Local: Strategy update, for all i ∈ I:
),
is the stacked vector of the primaldual variables and R FBF is the so-called FBF operator, i.e.,
where U 1 and U 2 characterize an alternative splitting of the mapping T in (15), i.e., T = U 1 + U 2 , where
and Ψ is the preconditining matrix, here defined as
When the mappings U 1 and U 2 are maximally monotone (which can be proven when Assumption 2 holds true by following a similar technical reasoning of that in Lemma 1), U 1 is Lipschitz continuous (Assumption 2) and the step sizes in the main diagonal of Ψ are set small enough, then the fixedpoint iteration (26) converges to some ω 
IV. GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING: ADVANCED ALGORITHMS
In this section, we design two novel semi-decentralized GNE seeking algorithms obtained by solving the monotone inclusion in (16) with different zero-finding methods: the forward-reflected-backward splitting [38] and, for a particular subclass of aggregative games with linear-coupling functions, the proximal-point method with (alternated) inertia. The main features of the proposed algorithms, e.g. convergence guarantees and communication requirements, are summarized and compared with those of the existing methods in Table I .
A. (Inertial) Forward-reflected-backward algorithm
In this section, we present a single-layer, single communication round algorithm for monotone generalized aggregative games that overcomes the technical and computational limitations of all the algorithms in Section III-C. The design of the proposed method is based on the Forward-Reflected-Backward splitting (FoRB) recently proposed in [38] to find a zero of the sum of two maximally monotone operators, one of which is single-valued and Lipschitz continuous. The proposed method is summarized in Algorithm 5.
Also for Algorithm 5, we describe the generated dynamics as a compact inertial fixed-point iteration,
is the stacked vector of primalvariable iterates, the components mappings T 1 , T 2 as in (17)−(18) and the preconditioning Φ as in (22) . If the stepsizes in the main diagonal of Φ are chosen small enough, then the iteration (30), namely, the inertial FoRB splitting [38, Corollary 4.4] on the operators Φ −1 T 1 and Φ −1 T 2 , converges to some ω * := col(x * , λ * ) ∈ zer(T 1 + T 2 ) = zer(T ), where x * is a v-GNE.
ALGORITHM 5: Inertial FoRB (I-FoRB)
Initialization: θ ∈ [0, 1/3) and δ > 2ℓ/(1 − 3θ), with ℓ as in Assumption 2; ∀i ∈ I, setx
, avg(x k−1 )), (2) diff. non-diff. as in (2) non-diff. as in (2) non-diff. as in (2) linear coupling as in (31) Inertial version
Alternating inertia
Over-relaxation
Our first main result is to establish global convergence of Algorithm 5 to a v-GNE when the mapping F is maximally monotone and Lipschitz continuous (Assumption 2) and the step sizes are chosen small enough. 
B. Customized preconditioned proximal point algorithm
In this subsection, we focus on a particular class of aggregative games, where the cost functions have the form
where C ∈ S n is a symmetric matrix. We emphasize that this particular structure arises in several engineering applications, where x i denotes the usage level of a certain commodity, whose disutility is modeled by the cost function g i (x i ), while the term Cavg(x) represents a price function that linearly depends on the average usage level of the overall population, see [5] , [39] , [40] , [41] for some application examples.
The next statement shows that aggregative games with such special structure are potential games [42, Def. 2.1].
Lemma 2:
There exists a continuous function φ :
Proof: For aggregative games with liner coupling functions as in (31) , the pseudo-subdifferential P in (6) reads as
Algorithm 6: Inertial customized PPP (I-cPPP)
which is a symmetric mapping, i.e., ∇ x P (x) = ∇ x P (x) ⊤ for all x ∈ Ω. Thus, the proof follows by [25, Th. 1.3.1].
It follows by Lemma 2 that a v-GNE of the game in (4) corresponds to a solution to the optimization problem argmin φ(x) s.t. x ∈ X . However, in many practical setups, a centralized solution to this problem is not feasible since it would require a high degree of coordination among selfish agents and also an "unbearable overload of information exchange" [42, §3.3] . Moreover, distributed optimization algorithms, see e.g. [43] , can only deal with feasible sets X in (7) with Cartesian product structure, namely, the case of non-generalized games. This motivates us to investigate a customized algorithm for aggregative games with cost functions as in (31) , which we summarize in the next table.
The next theorem establishes global convergence of Algorithm 6 to a v-GNE of aggregative games with linear coupling functions as in (31) , when the associated pseudosubdifferential P is maximally monotone, as postulated next.
Assumption 4:
The pseudo-subdifferential mapping P in (6) is maximally monotone over Ω.
We remark that this Assumption is less strict than Assumption 2, since the monotonicity of the coupled part F is not required. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the (strong) monotonicity of P for this class of aggregative games are discussed in [44, Cor. 1] . For instance, C 0 is sufficient to guarantee a maximally monotone pseudo-subdifferential.
Theorem 2: (Convergence of I-cPPP (Algorithm 6)) Consider the game in (4) with cost functions as in (31) . Let Assumptions 1 and 4 hold true. Then, the sequence (col(x k , λ k )) k∈N generated by Algorithm 6, globally converges to some col(x * , λ * ) ∈ zer(T ), where x * is a v-GNE.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 11: As for gradient-based methods, to compute a v-GNE via Algorithm 6, the agents must know the population size, N . However, if an approximate solution, i.e., a v-GAE, is equally desirable, this requirement can be relaxed by removing the correction term
⊤ z in the local updates:
Algorithm 6 as a fixed-point iteration:
In compact form, the dynamics generated by Algorithm 6 read as the inertial fixed-point iteratioñ
−1 is the generalized resolvent operator of the mapping T in (15) with preconditioning matrix
with Φ as in (22) . The iteration in (35) corresponds to the inertial preconditioned proximal-point method in [45] applied to the mapping T . When T is maximally monotone (which follows by Assumption 4) and the step-sizes in the main diagonal of Φ are set such that
C T is firmly nonexpansive (1/2−averaged) w.r.t. the Φ C −induced norm, · ΦC . Moreover, if the inertial parameter θ k are non-decreasing and small enough, then the inertial fixed-point iteration (35) converges to some ω
, where x * is a v-GNE. We provide the full convergence analysis in Appendix B.
Remark 12 (cPPP is a single-layer algorithm):
Both the PPP (Algorithm 3) and our cPPP (Algorithm 6) rely on the same fixed-point iteration, which is generated by proximalpoint method. However, while the PPP is double-layer, namely, it requires the solution of a sub-game at each iteration, cPPP is single-layer. The idea behind the cPPP is in fact to exploit the special structure of the pseudosubdifferential P in (32) to customize the preconditioning matrix, Φ C , and in turn solve the inner loop of the PPP with a single implicit iteration, namely, the parallel solution of N local, decoupled, strongly convex optimization problems.
Remark 13 (Fully-uncoordinated step-sizes):
Unlike all the previously presented gradient-based algorithms, the choice of the local step-sizes and inertial parameters in Algorithm 6 is based on local information only. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first and only inertial, fixed-step v-GNE seeking algorithm that enjoys this important property.
Over-relaxed cPPP (Algorithm 6B): To conclude this section, we present the over-relaxed variant of cPPP, i.e., or-cPPP. This new method is obtained by substituting the inertial steps of primal and dual variables in Algorithm 6, i.e., (33) and (34), respectively, with the relaxation steps
where the relaxation sequence θ k k∈N must be chosen s.t.
Similarly to Algorithm 6, or-cPPP can be compactly cast as the following Krasnosel'skii-Mann fixed-point iteration:
Thus, its convergence readily follows by [26, Prop. 5.16] , since the generalized resolvent
While there is no interest in doing under-relaxation with θ k less than 1, overrelaxation with θ k larger than 1 (close to 2) may be beneficial for the convergence speed, as often observed in practice. Interestingly, the choice of the over-relaxation steps θ k in (39) is independent from the properties of the mapping T .
C. Alternating inertial steps for averaged operators
In this subsection, we propose an alternating inertial scheme which is applicable to the algorithms in Sections III and IV, and whose updates can be described as a special fixedpoint iteration of an averaged operator. An advantage of this scheme is that the generated even subsequence is contractive (Fejér monotone) towards a v-GNE. Furthermore, the inertial extrapolation step sizes, θ k , can freely vary in [0, 1), namely, they do not need to be monotonically non-decreasing. These requirements are less restrictive than those in [36] , [45] , thus resulting in more efficient algorithms.
Next, we first introduce the idea of alternated inertia in operator-theoretic terms, and then apply it to two v-GNE seeking algorithms, the I-pFB (Algorithm 1B) and the I-cPPP (Algorithm 6). Let R be an averaged mapping. The alternating inertial Banach-Picard iteration then reads as follows:
where ω −1 = ω 0 is the initialization.
Lemma 3: Let R be η−averaged, with fix(R) = ∅. Then, the even subsequence (ω 2k+2 ) k∈N generated by (41) , with θ ∈ 0, 1−η η , converges to someω ∈ fix(R).
Proof:
The odd and even subsequences in (41b) read as ∀k ∈ N :
Let us define the mapping R θ := R • ((1 + θ)R − θ Id). The next lemma shows that, for θ small enough, R θ is averaged and has the same fixed points of R.
Lemma 4: Let R be η−averaged, with η ∈ (0, 1), and set θ ∈ (0, (1 − η)/η). The following statements hold:
Proof: 
In view of (42) and Lemma 4, the even subsequence in (41b) can be recast as
where R θ is ν−averaged, with ν ∈ (0, 1) given by Lemma 4 (iii). Thus, the convergence of the sequence (ω k+2 ) k∈N to someω ∈ fix(R θ ) = fix(R) follows by [26, Prop. 5.15] .
Finally, we propose some explicit rules to choose the alternating inertial extrapolation step sizes for the pFB (Algorithm 1B) and for the cPPP (Algorithm 6). In fact, in Section V-B, we observe via numerical simulations that these alternatedinertia variants outperform the standard-inertia algorithms in terms of convergence speed. Let us then conclude the section with the associated convergence results.
Corollary 1: (Convergence of alternating inertial pFB (aIpFB))
Let Assumptions 1, 3 hold true. Then, the sequence (col(x k , λ k )) k∈N generated by Algorithm 1B with extrapolation steps set as
globally converges to some col(x * , λ * ) ∈ zer(T ), where x * is a v-GNE. Proof: The pFB algorithm (Algorithm 1) reads as the fixed-point iteration in (20) , where the mapping R FB is η := ( 
globally converges to some col(x * , λ * ) ∈ zer(T ), where x * is a v-GNE. Proof: The non-inertial cPPP (Algorithm 6) reads as the fixed-point iteration in (35) To study the performance of the proposed algorithms, we formulate a charging coordination problem for a large population of nooncooperative plug-in electric vehicles (PEV) as a generalized aggregative game, as in [17, §6] . In subsection V-A, we introduce the model for the PEV agents, formalize the charging control game and verify that the necessary technical assumptions are satisfied. In subsection V-B we compare the performance of our algorithm against some standard methods.
A. Game formulation
We adopt the same model in [17, §6] . Consider the charging coordination problem for a large population of N ≫ 1 noncooperative PEV over a time horizon made of multiple charging intervals {1, 2, . . . , n}. The state of vehicle i at time t is denote by the variable s i (t). The time evolution of s i (t) is described by the discrete-time system
where x i (t) denotes the charging control input and b i the charging efficiency.
Constraints: At each time instant t, the charging input x i (t) must be nonnegative and cannot exceed an upper bound x i (t) ≥ 0. Moreover, the final state of charge must satisfy s i (n + 1) ≥ η i , where η i ≥ 0 is the desired state of charge of vehicle i. We assume that each PEV agent i decides on its charging strategy x i = col(x i (1), . . . , x i (n)) ∈ Ω i ⊂ R n , where the set Ω i can be expressed as
) and s i (1) is the state of charge at the beginning of the time horizon.
Furthermore, for each time instant t, the overall power that the grid can deliver to the PEV is denoted by N K(t), thus introducing the following coupling constraints:
which in compact form can be cast as (1
Cost functions: The cost function of each PEV represents its electricity bill over the horizon of length n plus a local penalty term g i (e.g., the battery degradation cost [46] , [47] ), i.e,
where g i is convex and the energy price for each time interval p t : R ≥0 → R >0 is monotonically increasing, continuosly differentiable and depends on the ratio between the total consumption and the total capacity, i.e., (d(t) + avg(x(t)))/κ(t), where d(t) and avg(x(t)) :
represent the non-PEV and PEV demand at time t divided by N and κ(t) is the total production capacity divided by N as in [7, eq. (6) ].
Aggregative game: Overall, each PEV i, given the charging inputs of the other PEV, aims at solving the following optimization problem:
Next, we show that the proposed charging control game in (49) does satisfy our technical setup. The local cost functions J i 's in (48) are convex w.r.t. the local variable x i , the local constraint sets Ω i 's in (46) are non-empty (for an appropriate choice of the parameters), convex and compact, the coupling constraints in (47) are affine and their intersection with the local constraints non-empty (for an appropriate choice of the parameters), namely, the Slater's condition holds true. Hence, Assumption 1 is satisfied. In particular, there exist at least one GNE of the game in (49), see Remark 2.
The correspondent PG in (8) and approximate PG in (11) read more explicitly as follows:
The following lemma shows the properties of these mappings depending on the choice of the price function p in (48) .
Lemma 5 ([17, Lemma 3]):
The following hold: (i) For all i ∈ I, let g i be convex and the price function p be monotone, thenF in (50) is maximally monotone; (ii) For all i ∈ I, let g i be convex and the price function p be affine, i.e., p(avg(x)) = Cavg(x) + c, with C ∈ R m×nN , and strongly monotone, i.e., (C + C ⊤ )/2 ≻ 0, then F in (51) is strongly monotone. Proof: (i) and (ii) follow from [17, Lemma 3 (i) ].
B. Numerical analysis
In our numerical study we consider an heterogeneous population of PEV playing over a time horizon of n = 24 charging intervals. All the parameters of the game are drawn from 
, where x ⋆ is a v-GAE.
uniform distributions and fixed over the course of a simulation. Specifically, for all i ∈ I, we set: the desired final state of charge l i in (46) according to l i ∼ (0.5, 1.5), where ∼ (τ 1 , τ 2 ) denotes the uniform distribution over an interval (τ 1 , τ 2 ) with τ 1 < τ 2 ; for all t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the upper charging input bound asx i (t) ∼ (1, 5), with probability 0.8,x i (t) = 0 otherwise. For all t, the non-PEV demand d(t) is taken as the typical base demand over a summer day in the United States [7, Figure 1] ; κ(t) = 12 kW, and the upper bound K(t) = 0.55 kW is chosen such that the coupling constraints in (47) are active in the middle of the night. In the remainder of this section, we study the convergence properties of the proposed algorithms on two different scenarios characterized by a different choice of the price function p and local cost functions g i , in (48) .
1) Monotone price function:
Consider the price function p t (avg(x(t))) := 0.15
as in [7, §VII.B] and a local cost function g i defined as
where π i ∼ (0.1, 0.8) and a i (t) ∼ (0.1, 0.4), for all t ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Under these choices, it follows from Lemma 5 (i) that the approximate PG in (50) is maximally monotone. Therefore, a v-GAE of the game in (49) can be found with the algorithms in Section III-C and the FoRB (Algorithm 5).
In Fig. 1 , we compare the total number of iterations required by FBF (Alg. 4) and FoRB (Alg. 5) to achieve convergence to a v-GAE (i.e.,
, over different population sizes N varying from 50 to 200 agents. For each N , we run 10 simulations with random parameters. On average, FoRB converges at least 5 times faster than FBF in terms of number of iterations, and, thus, 10 times faster in terms of communication rounds between PEVs and central coordinator. Moreover, unlike FBF, the convergence speed of FoRB seems not affected by increasing the number of agents and randomly varying the parameters of the problem.
2) Linear price function: Consider the price function
where C = I n , c = col(d(1), . . . , d(n)), and the local convex cost function g i , for all i ∈ I, as
For instance, the local penalty term g i in (55) ∈ Ω i . Under these choices, the pseudo-gradient mapping F in (51) is strongly monotone, by Lemma 5 (ii), and Lipschitz continuous, since affine. Thus, it follows by Remark 5 that F is cocoercive. The unique v-GNE of the game in (49) can be found with the algorithms in Section III-B and, since the cost functions have the same structure in (31) , with the cPPP.
First, we consider an heterogeneous population of PEV's, by setting the parameters of the local penalty terms g i in (55) as follows:
, for all t. In Fig. 2a , we compare the average number of iterations required to achieve convergence (i.e., x k − x * / x * ≤ 10 −6 ) for pFB (Alg. 1), cPPP (Alg. 6) and their inertial variants, for different population sizes N . For each N , we run 10 simulations with random parameters and considered the average number of iterations for convergence. The step sizes of all the algorithms are set 1% smaller than their theoretical upper bounds. On average, cPPP outperforms pFB. For both pFB and cPPP, their inertial variants show better performances with respect to the vanilla algorithms. Overall, the over-relaxed cPPP is the fastest among all the considered methodologies. We note that, the convergence speed of all the algorithms seems only mildly affected by the population size.
In Fig. 2b , we repeat the same analysis for an homogeneous population of PEV's. Specifically, we set the parameters of the local penalty term in (55) as Q i = 0.1 and p i = 0.2, for all i ∈ N . The performances of all the algorithms improve with respect to the case with heterogeneous agents. On average, cPPP requires less then half the iterations/communication rounds of pFB. For both pFB and CPPP, their inertial variants show better performances with respect to the standard algorithms. Overall, the alternated inertial cPPP (aI-cPPP) and the over-relaxed cPPP (or-cPPP) are the fastest among all the considered methodologies (less than 50 communication rounds with the central coordinator to achieve a precision of 10 −6 , independently on the total number of PEVs).
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Generalized Nash equilibrium problems in monotone aggregative games can be efficiently solved via accelerated, semi-decentralized, single-layer, single-communication-periteration, fixed-step algorithms. For this class of equilibrium problems, the over-relaxation seems the most effective decentralized way to speed up convergence. The study of adaptive step sizes is left for future work. 
, where x * is a v-GNE.
(i): Let us recast Algorithm 4 in a compact form as
Since diag(prox α1g1+ιΩ 1 , . . . , prox αN gN +ιΩ
where we usedᾱ
Let ω k := col(x k , λ k ) be the stacked vector of the iterates. The inclusions in (58)-(59) can be cast in compact form as
where T 1 , T 2 and Φ as in (17), (18) and (19), respectively. By making ω k+1 explicit in the last inclusion, we obtain
where the auxiliary updates can be cast in a compact form as
thus concluding the first part of the proof.
(ii): Before studying the convergence of iteration (60), we show that, if the step-sizes are chosen as in Algorithm 5, then the preconditioning matrix Φ is positive definite. Lemma 6: Let {α i } i∈I and β be set as in Algorithm 5. Then, the following statements hold:
(i) Φ − δI 0;
Proof: (i): By the generalized Gershgorin circular theorem [48, Th. 2] , each eigenvalue µ of the matrix Φ in (19) satisfies at least one of the following inequalities:
Hence, if we set the step-sizes {α i } i∈I , β as in Algorithm 5, the inequalities (62)-(63) yield to µ ≥ δ, where δ > 2ℓ by design choice. It follows that the smallest eigenvalue of Φ, i.e., µ min (Φ), satisfies µ min (Φ) ≥ δ > 0. Hence, Φ − δI 0. Since Φ −1 is δ −1 −Lipschitz, by Lemma 6 (ii), and T 1 is ℓ−Lipschitz, by Assumption 2, then their composition, i.e., Φ −1 • T 1 , is τ −Lipschitz continuous, with τ := δ −1 ℓ < (1 − 3θ)/2, since δ > 2ℓ/(1 − 3θ), by design choice.
The fixed-point iteration (60), that corresponds to Algorithm 5 by the first part of this proof, is the inertial FoRB splitting algorithm on the mappings Φ −1 T 1 and Φ −1 T 2 . The convergence of (60) to some ω * := col(x * , λ * ) ∈ zer(T 1 + T 2 ) follows by [38, Corollary 4.4, Remark 2.6], since Φ −1 T 1 and Φ −1 T 2 are maximally monotone in the Φ−induced norm and Φ −1 T 1 is τ −Lipschitz continuous, with τ < (1 − 3θ)/2. To conclude, we note that ω * ∈ zer(Φ −1 T 1 + Φ −1 T 2 ) = zer(T ), since Φ ≻ 0, by Lemma 6 (i), and T 1 + T 2 = T . Since the limit point ω * ∈ zer(T ) = ∅, then x * is a v-GNE of the game in (4), by Proposition 1, thus concluding the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
To establish global convergence, we show that (i) By stacking-up the inclusions (64), for all i ∈ I, we obtain
where the first 3 terms on the right-hand side correspond to the pseudo-subdifferential mapping P (x k+1 ), i.e., G(x k+1 ) + 
Let ω k := col(x k , λ k ) be the stacked vector of the iterates. The inclusions in (65)-(66) can be cast in a compact form as
where T and Φ C as in (15) and (36), respectively. By making ω k+1 explicit in the last inclusion, we obtain
By combining (67) and (68), we obtain the fixed-point iteration in (35) , that correspond to the inertial PPP method [45, Th. 2.1] on Φ −1 C T and, thus, concludes the first part of the proof.
(ii): The following Lemma shows that, if the step-sizes are chosen as in Algorithm 6, then the preconditioning matrix Φ C is positive definite.
Lemma 7: Let {α i } i∈I and β be set as in Algorithm 6, then, Φ C ≻ 0.
Proof: This proof follows the same technical reasoning of the proof of Lemma 6 (i) and, thus, is omitted due to space limitation.
The fixed-point iteration (35) , that corresponds to Algorithm 6 by the first part of this proof, is the inertial PPP algorithm applied on the operator Φ C T ) = zer(T ), since Φ C ≻ 0, by Lemma 7. Since the limit point ω * ∈ zer(T ) = ∅, then x * is a v-GNE of the game in (4), by Proposition 1, concluding the proof.
